Removal from Supreme Court to Lower Court by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 38 
Number 2 Volume 38, May 1964, Number 2 Article 21 
May 2013 
Removal from Supreme Court to Lower Court 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1964) "Removal from Supreme Court to Lower Court," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 
38 : No. 2 , Article 21. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol38/iss2/21 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In that case the process server stated, by affidavit, that when
he informed the receptionist at defendant's office that he had a
summons to serve on the defendant, the receptionist directed him
to present it to the managing agent of the defendant, who was
also the executive secretary to the vice president. After the pro-
cess server informed the managing agent of the nature of his
business, she went into the vice president's office. She returned
shortly thereafter and told him to leave the summons with her and
that "she would take care of it."
Defendant's motion to dismiss raised the question of whether
this was valid service upon the corporation. The court, quoting Judge
Cardozo's test enunciated in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,40 stated
that "if their [the agent's] positions are such as to lead to a just
presumption that notice to them will be notice to the principal,
the corporation must submit. . .. "41 The agent's position, however,
must be one of importance and responsibility. The court observed
that the attitude which now appears to be taking hold is that a
person can be a managing agent to receive process if his duties
entail the exercise of discretion in the handling of the corporation's
business and he is in "constant communication with the officers."'42
The court observed that, in light of the intent of the Legis-
lature to simplify the method of service upon a corporation, "para-
mount consideration should be given to substance rather than
procedural technicalities. . . -43 This ruling is in accord with the
overall theory of the CPLR, to give primary weight to substance
rather than form.4 4  But note that the teller at a bank window or
at a bowling alley stand is not the "cashier" or "assistant cashier"
that section 311(1) contemplates.45
Removal from Supreme Court to Lower Court
Section 325 of the* CPLR provides a procedure for transferring
a properly commenced litigation in the supreme court to a court
of inferior jurisdiction where the relief sought may be obtained in
40220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
41 Id. at 269, 115 N.E. at 918.
42 B & J Bakery, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 40 Misc. 2d
839, 842, 244 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288 (Sup. Ct. 1963). To support its position the
court quoted from Green v. Morningside Heights Housing Corp., 13 Misc.
2d 124, 125, 177 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nwm., 7 App. Div. 2d
708, 180 N.Y.S.2d 104 (lst Dep't 1958), where Mr. Justice Steuer said:
"Where the delivery is so close both in time and space that it can be
classified as a part of the same act service is effected."
43 B & J Btakery, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 40 Misc. 2d
839, 843, 244 N.Y.S.2d 284, 289 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
441 WEINsTE N, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK Civii. PRAmcTE ff 311.01
(1963).
45 Oustecky v. Farmingdale Lanes, Inc., 246 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct.
1964); cf. Taylor v. Commercial Bank, 174 N.Y. 181, 66 N.E. 726 (1903).
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the lower court. In Stevens v. MVAIC,46 plaintiff sought leave to
transfer the action from the supreme court to the New York City
Civil Court. The action had arisen out of an alleged hit-and-run
accident, and since it was brought directly against MVAIC it
was governed by Section 618(a) of the Insurance Law. This sec-
tion provides that the supreme court has the power to allow an
action to be brought directly against MVAIC "in such court."
Due to the exactness of this language, the court held that only the
supreme court had jurisdiction over such a suit, and therefore
removal to the civil court must be denied. Since the civil court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the action could not properly
have been commenced there, and hence Section 325 of the CPLR
precluded any such removal.
PARTIES GENERALLY
Section 1001 - Necessary Joinder of Parties
Section 1001 of the CPLR, providing for joinder of necessary
parties, essentially maintains prior practice but provides for greater
flexibility in the resolution of nonjoinder problems. Subdivision
(b) of the statute permits the court, under certain enumerated
situations, discretion to excuse the nonjoinder of a person who
ought to be a party, but over whom jurisdiction cannot be ob-
tained.47  The determination of whether or not to permit the
action to continue without joinder of such a person will not depend
on his being classified as "conditionally necessary" or "indispens-
able," because such language has been eliminated.
The section achieves flexibility by suggesting criteria for the
court in its determination of whether or not to dismiss the action
for nonjoinder. Essentially, these criteria permit the court to
weigh the interests of the litigants, the absentee and the public. 48
Two cases have recently interpreted this statute. In one,49 the
court held that an action to foreclose a second mortgage would be
allowed to continue without the joinder of the first mortgagee since
the rights of all the parties presently before the court could be
adiudicated without his being joined. The court indicated that
prior case law determining which parties were "necessary" would
still be important under the CPLR.50
46 (Sup. Ct., New York County), 151 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1964, p. 12, col. 3.
472 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ff 1001.01
(1964).
48 For a discussion of these various factors, see 1957 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No.
6(b), FIRST PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoMsiITTEm ON PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 248-52 [hereinafter cited as FIRST REP.].
49 Commercial Trading Co. v. Little N. Parkway Realty Corp., 41 Misc.
2d 472, 245 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
50 Ibid.
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